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Abstract
We bring new evidence to bear on the role of intermediaries in frictional matching
markets and on how parties design contracts with them. Specifically, we examine two
features of contracts between landlords and agents in the Manhattan residential rental
market. In our data, 72 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between
landlords and agents (the remaining 28 percent are non-exclusive); and in 21 percent
of listings, the landlord commits to pay the agent’s fee (in the other 79 percent,
the tenant pays the agent’s the fee). Our analysis highlights that these contractual
features reflect landlords’ concerns about providing agents with incentives to exert
effort specific to their rental units and to screen among heterogeneous tenants.
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1 Introduction
In many markets with heterogeneous goods and agents, the idiosyncratic match value is
an important component of the gains from trade. In these markets, the matching process
between buyers and sellers often involve frictions, and, thus, specialized intermediaries
emerge to facilitate the exchange. In this paper, we investigate the role of intermediaries
in matching markets by examining contracts between landlords and real-estate agents in
the Manhattan residential rental market.1
Our empirical analysis highlights two concerns that are key to understanding the main
contractual features observed in this market: landlords’ desires to provide agents with in-
centives to exert effort specific to their rental units and to screen across heterogeneous
tenants. Specifically, more unusual rental units might require agents’ specific investments,
in line with a broad (primarily theoretical) literature on vertical contracting. One such
specific investment requires learning landlords’ preferences and tenancy requirements in
order to screen tenants on their behalf. Moreover, we argue that a rather unusual contrac-
tual term—whether the landlord or tenant should pay the broker’s fee—affects tenants’
likely schedule of payments, thereby allowing landlords to screen between long-term and
short-term tenants.
The Manhattan residential rental market provides an ideal setting in which to analyze
the role of intermediaries in matching markets through their contractual arrangements.
First, as in typical housing markets, there is a significant heterogeneity across housing units
and across tenants. Second, it is a large market, as more than 75 percent of Manhattan
households live in rented dwellings, and brokers and agents are widely used. Third, the
market displays interesting variation in the way that landlords and brokers contract. More
specifically, the landlord sometimes lists his unit on a real-estate platform directly and
deals with any agent bringing a potential tenant—i.e., an “open” listing—and sometimes
designates an exclusive agent to market the rental unit and through whom all tenants
must approach the landlord (though co-brokered deals are possible and, indeed, provide
1We use the terms brokers and agents interchangeably. Formally, the licensing requirements for brokers
and salespersons are different, and a licensed salesbroker or associate (licensed) broker typically works for
a firm owned by a licensed broker. A licensed broker will typically employ several other licensed brokers
and salespersons. In common parlance, these are rental agents.
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the rationale for such listings)—i.e., an “exclusive” listing. Such exclusive relationships
require the agent to agree to market the rental unit for a specified period of time (usually
2-3 months), on the owner’s stated terms. One such term, which also appears in open
listings, specifies whether the agent collects the fee from the tenant or from the landlord—
the latter marketed as “no fee” apartments. Thus, four possible contractual arrangements
exist—combinations of exclusive/open and fee/no fee.
To understand the role of these contractual features, we use several sources to bring
together new data on the Manhattan residential real estate rental market. Our rental
listings data, provided by an online platform for renting real estate, suggest that concern
about providing incentives to brokers determines landlords’ choices between exclusive and
non-exclusive arrangements since cross-sectional variation in apartment characteristics is
related to this choice. As we describe in Section 4, landlords face a trade-off when decid-
ing to enter into an exclusive relationship with an agent. On the one hand, agents are
more willing to exert greater effort when advertising exclusive apartments since they reap
greater benefits from this effort. On the other hand, agents have renters looking for similar
units, and granting exclusivity to one agent may dampen the incentives of others who may
otherwise show the apartment. This trade-off varies according to the characteristics of the
unit. More precisely, the more atypical the apartment, the less likely it is that an agent
has renters looking for similar units. Thus, landlords should be more likely to use exclusive
contracts when the apartment is more atypical.
Hence, following Haurin (1988), we construct an index of atypicality for each apartment
and find that more-atypical apartments are more likely listed with exclusive deals. The
magnitude of this effect is quite large: A one-standard-deviation increase in the value of
the index of apartment atypicality increases the probability that a listing is exclusive by
4.6 percentage points, which is approximately a 6.4-percent increase in the probability that
the listing is exclusive.
The data also suggest that landlords use exclusive agents for the purposes of screening
or steering tenants. This is a rather delicate issue for landlords since some screening
criteria would fall foul of fair housing rights in the NYC Human Rights Law2 (for example,
screening families with children or applicants with particular occupations, such as lawyers
2See “Fair Housing NYC” at http://www.nyc.gov/html/fhnyc/html/home/home.shtml
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who might be perceived as more difficult tenants). We find that landlords use exclusive
agents for apartments for which the tenant’s suitability appears to be a greater concern—
for example, almost all furnished units in the data feature an exclusive agent (though
this is also consistent with the unit being atypical); similarly, units in co-op and condo
buildings, and units that allow pets (where there may be considerable variation in tenants)
are more likely to have exclusive listings. We also find that landlords are more likely to
sign exclusive agreements when local vacancy rates are lower: This would be surprising if
exclusivity contracts existed solely to induce agent effort; however, it is consistent with the
idea that landlords are more concerned about selecting particular types of tenants when it
is relatively easy to find tenants.
Turning to the other source of variation in contractual arrangements, standard economic
theory suggests that whether the landlord or the tenant pays the broker’s fee should have
no effect on outcomes, as landlords also set the prices at which to rent their apartments.
However, if landlords face external constraints over the nominal rental price that they can
charge, then which party pays the broker’s fee affects the parties’ share of the surplus.
While the extreme case of rent control does not arise in our data, they do include many
rent-stabilized apartments, as we describe in Section 3.3 For these apartments, landlords
do not have full discretion to change rental prices when leases are renewed, and since many
tenants anticipate renewing the lease for a rent-stabilized unit, a landlord is likely to prefer
a higher initial rent (and to pay the broker’s fee).
More broadly, Genesove (2003) finds nominal rigidities in apartment rents even for
unregulated apartments and greater rigidities for units housing tenants who continue from
the previous year. Hence, when choosing between two identical apartments with a trade-
off between the annual rent and the broker’s fee—i.e., one apartment with a higher annual
rent, but the landlord pays the broker’s fee; the other apartment with a lower annual rent,
but the tenant pays the broker’s fee—tenants expecting to stay in the apartment longer-
term should be more willing to pay the broker’s fee directly in anticipation of even lower
relative rents if they renew their lease. Landlords’ desire to attract longer-term tenants
varies with market conditions. In particular, future nominal rigidities in rents reduce the
3To qualify for rent control, a tenant must have lived continuously in an apartment since July 1, 1971;
once vacant, the unit becomes rent-stabilized or is deregulated.
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value of a longer-term tenant relatively more in “cold” markets—i.e., when the demand is
weak relative to supply, and, thus, the vacancy rate is high—than in “hot” markets. Hence,
landlords should be more likely to pay brokers’ fees when the vacancy rate is high. Indeed,
we find that landlords are more likely to pay brokers’ fees when the apartment is in a rent-
stabilized building and when the vacancy rate is higher. Again, the magnitudes of these
effects are sizable: The probability that the tenant pays the broker’s fee is 5.3 percentage
points lower for a rent-stabilized apartment than for one that is not, corresponding to a
6.7-percent decrease in the probability that the tenant pays the fee. In addition, a one-
standard-deviation increase in our estimate of the appropriate vacancy rate increases the
probability that the tenant pays the broker fee by approximately 5.8 percentage points,
which is approximately a 7.3-percent decrease in the probability that the tenant pays the
broker fee.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature that investigates the role of intermediaries in search
markets. The theoretical literature provides useful insights into the existence and use of
intermediaries (for a thorough review, see Spulber, 1999), as well as into their compen-
sation structures and incentives (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2011; Lewis and Ottaviani, 2011;
Loertscher and Niedermayer, 2012a and b). However, empirical studies of intermediaries’
contractual arrangements have been hampered because data availability is usually limited
and because such agreements often display little variation within an industry. Further,
in most papers, the intermediary holds inventory (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987; Yavas,
1992; Johri and Leach, 2002; Shevchenko, 2004; and Shi and Siow, 2011). Instead, we
focus on contractual arrangements between asset owners and intermediaries in a market in
which intermediaries’ main role is to match buyers and sellers. Finally, Inderst and Otta-
viani (2011) study whether buyers or sellers should pay fees for recommendations, as well
as the effects of these payments on intermediaries’ incentives to misinform and mis-sell.
We contribute to this literature by studying a setting in which who pays the fee is largely
unrelated to the provision of incentives to the intermediaries. Instead, it affects matching
by buyers and sellers through changing the schedule of payments, thereby helping one side
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to screen the other.
The literature on real estate brokerage (surveyed in Han and Strange, 2014; Benjamin,
Jud and Sirmans, 2000a and b; and Zeits and Sirmans, 2011) focuses mainly on sales rather
than rentals. As we discuss below, there is evidence that the form of the contract between
the seller and agent can affect agent behavior, though little work relates this choice to
characteristics of the house or to market conditions. Furthermore, sales markets do not
feature variation in who pays the broker’s fee. In addition, in contrast to a sale, in a rental
transaction, the landlord might care about the type of tenant with whom he signs a contract.
Indeed, this latter consideration suggests that discrimination is of greater concern in rental
markets than in sales markets. The popular press and anecdotal discussions with brokers
suggest that parties do not always strictly adhere to fair-housing laws in New York City
(Toy, 2007). An extensive literature employs field experiments to document and examine
such discrimination in both the U.S. and other markets; recent examples include Ahmed
and Hammarstedt (2008), Hanson and Zackary (2011), and Hanson, Hawley and Taylor
(2011). These studies tend to focus on landlord and tenant characteristics, rather than on
market conditions. A literature on real estate sales finds that there is evidence of broker and
customer prejudice (Zhao, Ondrich and Yinger, 2006) and that the level of discrimination
may depend on the state of the local market and a broker’s access to available units (Yinger,
1995). Hanson, Hawley and Taylor (2011) suggest that discrimination can be subtle—in
particular, through differences in language or tone in emails. Hence, the exclusive use of
a particular agent could be another subtle form of encouraging (or discouraging) certain
types of tenants. Although our data do not allow us to address this possibility directly, we
find some evidence that suggests such behavior.
Our primary results on exclusivity suggest that the form of contracts may affect agent
incentives for non-contractible efforts and that the nature of this effort (and the efficiency
of more-concentrated agency) might vary with apartment characteristics. Previous work on
real estate sales demonstrates a role for broker incentives. Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
(2001, 2004), studying the effect of brokers’ contracts on their performance, find that houses
sell faster under some contracts, but at a higher price under alternative brokers’ contracts.
Levitt and Syverson (2008) compare brokers’ incentives under two sets of circumstances: 1)
a real estate agent is hired by others to sell a home; and 2) a real estate agent sells his or her
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own home. The authors find that homes owned by real estate agents sell for more and stay
on the market longer than other houses. Hendel, Ortalo-Magne and Nevo (2009) study the
performance of real estate marketing platforms and find a trade-off between selling faster
on one platform and paying a lower commission on the other platform, but no difference
in final sale prices before commissions to brokers.
Finally, influential theoretical contributions have analyzed the role of exclusive con-
tracts; for thorough reviews, see Whinston (2006) and Rey and Verge´ (2008). The most
relevant papers for our analysis investigate the role of exclusive contracts in fostering
relationship-specific investments.4 The empirical literature on the role of exclusive con-
tracts is limited; for a thorough survey, see Lafontaine and Slade (2008). Sass and Sauerman
(1993) and Sass (2005) study the the determinants of exclusive contracts in beer distribu-
tion, and their findings are consistent with the idea that exclusive contracts protect parties’
specific investments. Finally, Asker (2004) finds that exclusive contracts enhance efficiency
and do not foreclose rivals. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the
determinants of exclusive contracts in a new empirical setting—rental apartments—that
provides greater variation across assets and, thus, in parties’ investment incentives.
3 Background: Real Estate Brokerage in the Manhat-
tan Residential Rental Market
The Manhattan residential rental market is one of the most important in the U.S., in terms
of both total number of units traded and total value. In both respects it is perhaps unusual:
Rental housing is much more prevalent in Manhattan than in other U.S. cities,5 and the
Manhattan real estate market is among the most expensive in the world.
4See, for example, Marvel (1982) and the more recent literature, including Segal and Whinston (2000),
de Meza and Selvaggi (2004) and Che and Sa´kovics (2004). Much of this literature is focused on exclusivity
affecting bargaining and hold-up under an assumption of ex-post efficient trade. Our setting is different,
inasmuch as terms of trade are (largely) determined ex-ante, and investments affect the probability of
trade. Exclusivity can lead a broker to exert more effort since, in the absence of exclusivity, the agent faces
a free-rider problem because investing in advertising and showing an apartment might lead to no return if
the apartment is rented through another agent.
5According to 2010 Census data, more than 75 percent of Manhattan households live in rented dwellings,
in contrast to the U.S. as a whole, where approximately 65 percent of households live in owned units.
7
The typical Manhattan residential rental transaction involves several steps, providing
landlords, renters and brokers with several choices among different contractual agreements.
First, the landlord chooses between working with a real estate broker or renting the unit
on her own. In contrast to the typical sales arrangement, the landlord does not necessarily
promise the agent a commission for completing a transaction; rather, the agent often collects
the fee from the renter—typically 15 percent of one year’s rent. An exclusive agent tries
to find renters directly, often advertising to other brokers through a brokers’ multiple
listing service (MLS), potentially co-brokering with a renter’s agent, and splitting the fee
(typically a 50/50 split).6 If the landlord does not offer a broker an exclusive contract, she
will advertise her rental property directly, either to potential renters (through Craigslist,
the New York Times, listings services, etc.) or to brokers (through similar channels or
through a brokers’ MLS).7 In the case of an open listing, any licensed agent in the city has
the right to advertise the listing and show the rental unit.8,9 Second, a landlord advertising
an apartment on a brokers’ listing service can promise a commission fee (typically either
one month’s rent or 15 percent of the annual rent) to the tenant’s agent; agents then show
these apartments to prospective tenants as no-fee or “owner-pay”listings. If the landlord
does not offer agents a fee, the open listing is a “fee listing,” in which case the agent recoups
his costs by charging a commission directly to the prospective tenant. The agent is legally
obliged to disclose if he is receiving a fee from the landlord.
Manhattan’s residential rental market is more heavily regulated than that of other U.S.
cities. The New York State Controller Thomas Di Napoli reports that two thirds of New
6Members of the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) are obliged to share their listings and allow
other agents to co-broker through REBNY’s listings service.
7The principal listings services at the time our data were collected were brokersNYC/MLX, OLR and
RealtyMX. There is substantial overlap in their listings coverage, in part because these share data from
the REBNY listing service.
8Consequently, when agents advertise open listings, they do not give full details of apartments. Thus, it
is hard for renters to view them independently, and before showing potential renters an apartment, agents
ask them to sign contracts saying that they will pay a fee or contact the landlord only through the agent.
9This description is something of a simplification; however, our data do not allow us to refine further. In
particular, our data do not allow us to distinguish open listings, in which the landlord markets to potential
tenants directly and in which brokers compete with landlords, from limited listings in which a tenant must
use a broker to rent the unit. Further, a landlord might employ a “pocket” listing, in which a landlord is
willing to work with only a limited number of brokers with whom the landlord has a relationship. Such
listings typically do not appear on a listings service and, thus, are not in our data (and this is, indeed, the
case for several large landlords whom we know to have been using such arrangements in this period).
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York City’s two million rental apartments faced some form of regulated rental rates in 2009
(Di Napoli, 2009). On aggregate, rent regulation induces misallocation and increases the
prices of non-regulated units (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003). Moreover, regulated apartments
are less likely to be available for rent and are more likely than unregulated ones to be
low-rent housing. For these reasons, they are less likely to appear in our listings data.
Most relevant for our study are rent-stabilized units, comprising approximately 45 percent
of New York City rental units and 39 percent of our data.10 These are apartments for
which the NYC Rent Guidelines Board annually determines maximal rental increases for
lease renewals.11 Rent-stabilized apartments include new-construction units, since owners
receive tax advantages if they include rent-stabilized units.
4 Landlords’ Decision-Making
We focus on two key decisions of landlords: 1) whether to enter into an exclusive relationship
with a broker; and 2) whether to commit to pay a broker’s fee or, instead, ask brokers (or
the exclusive broker) to collect their own fee from the tenant.
Landlords choose among these different contractual arrangements to find the most suit-
able tenants to maximize the long-term return of their units. We argue that the provision
of incentives to brokers determines landlords’ choice between exclusive and non-exclusive
arrangements. This is consistent with our empirical finding that cross-sectional variation in
apartment characteristics affects landlords’ choices. More precisely, the literature discussed
in Section 2 suggests that exclusive contracts are optimal when the agent’s specific effort
is key to determining the surplus of the relationship. In the case of real-estate markets,
agents’ effort has first-order effects on the time that the unit remains vacant and on the
rent that the unit can command. In particular, an agent makes specific efforts to market
10Several different forms of regulation affect Manhattan rental markets. Perhaps the most popularly
known is rent control, which establishes the maximum allowable rent that the landlord can charge the
tenant. However, this form of regulation applies to apartments that have been continuously rented by the
same tenant since July 1, 1971. Hence, our data do not feature such units.
11For example, in our data period, the Rent Guidelines Board, in Apartment & Loft Order #41, deter-
mined on June 21, 2009 that for one-year lease renewals for rent-stabilized apartments where the landlord
provides heat, the maximum by which the base rent could rise for a new lease commencing between October
1, 2009 and September 30, 2010 was three percent.
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an apartment: Viewing the unit to take photographs for advertising purposes; advertising
and showing the unit to interested renters; learning building and neighborhood amenities
in order to convey them to potential renters; and, possibly, learning landlords’ preferences
(for example, understanding a landlord’s requirements in terms of guarantors, financial
background, etc.). Some investment is at the level of the landlord or building rather than
at the level of individual units, and, thus, landlords tend to use the same exclusive agents
for several units, and agents tend to specialize in certain types of rental units. This spe-
cialization also reflects the fact that agents show several similar units to renters, seeking
the best matches.
These arguments suggest that landlords face a trade-off when deciding to enter into
an exclusive relationship with an agent. On the one hand, in the absence of any exclusive
relationship, an agent may show an apartment since he may have renters looking for similar
units, but his incentives may be dampened if another agent is awarded an exclusive contract
(since, in this case, the agent would have a co-broker and earn only a fraction of the
fee—typically half). On the other hand, an agent is more willing to exert greater effort
to advertise exclusive apartments (for standard free-riding arguments). Presumably, this
trade-off varies according to the unit’s characteristics. Specifically, the more atypical the
apartment, the less likely it is that the agent has renters looking for similar units and the
more important may be the agent’s specific effort; thus, it becomes more important for the
landlord to contract with one agent to market it (even at the cost of reducing the incentives
of other agents to do so).
To examine the landlord’s decision regarding atypical units, as described in detail below,
we consider several indications of how unusual an apartment is, and we construct an index
of atypicality for a unit. We find evidence that landlords are, indeed, more likely to
use exclusive contracts when a unit is more atypical, which supports the suggestion that
landlords might use exclusive relationships for specific investments.
Furthermore, a landlord might have concerns (both legal and more questionable) re-
garding the kind of tenant that occupies a unit. Such concerns could depend on apartment
characteristics—for example, furnished and “high-end” units, or those in co-op and condo
buildings, where the landlord is more likely to be an individual and where applications
might be more involved—or on potential tenants—for example, the pets that tenants may
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bring into “pet friendly” units—as well as market conditions. We find some suggestive
evidence consistent with the increased use of exclusive agents in circumstances in which
the landlord might have a heightened desire to screen tenants.
Of course, landlords choose not only a contractual arrangement with brokers, but also
the prices at which to rent their apartments.12 Hence, simple economic theory suggests
that whether the landlord or the tenant pays the broker’s fee should have no effect on
outcomes (in the same way that tax incidence does not depend on where the revenue is
collected). However, several features of this market suggest that who pays the fee may
make a difference.
If landlords face external constraints to the nominal rent that they can charge, then who
pays the broker’s fee affects parties’ share of the surplus. Genesove (2003) finds nominal
rigidities in apartment rents and greater rigidities for units whose tenants continued from
the previous year. As we described in Section 3, this type of price rigidity applies specifically
to rent-stabilized apartments. Thus, the landlords of these rent-stabilized apartments may
prefer to simultaneously pay brokers’ fees and set higher initial rents. This is consistent
with our empirical finding that landlords are more likely to pay the brokers’ fees for units
in rent-stabilized buildings.
Moreover, when choosing between two identical apartments with a trade-off between
the annual rent and the broker’s fee—i.e., one apartment has a higher annual rent, but the
landlord pays the broker’s fee; the other apartment has a lower annual rent, but the tenant
pays the broker fee—tenants expecting to stay in the apartment longer-term should be
more willing to pay the broker’s fee directly, to the extent that they expect some nominal
rigidity in the rental price. Similarly, credit-market imperfections imply that tenants and
landlords may have different preferences for paying the fixed up-front broker’s fee versus
spreading it over the life of the lease. Landlords’ desire to attract longer-term tenants is
likely to vary with market conditions. Presumably, future nominal rigidities in rents reduce
the value of a longer-term tenant relatively more in “cold”markets—i.e., when the demand
is weak relative to supply, and, thus, the vacancy rate is high—than in “hot”markets. This
12More precisely, the landlord sets the listed price (this is the price that we observe in our data). There
may be negotiation over the transacted price; however, anecdotally, the correlation between listed and
transacted rental prices is high, and, most often, units are rented at the listed price.
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is consistent with our empirical finding that landlords are more likely to pay the brokers’
fees in cold markets.
5 Data
We combine several distinct datasets to obtain a broad picture of Manhattan’s rental
markets. The main one is a unique dataset on the New York rental market provided by
MLX, an online platform for renting and buying real estate (www.mlx.com; in the earlier
period of our sample, the name of the platform was brokersnyc.com). The website is
one of the leading platforms for rental listings in New York City. It is used primarily by
management companies and landlords’ brokers to advertise their openings, and by renters’
brokers to search among those openings.
Each listing includes key apartment characteristics—such as the Monthly Rent, the
Number of Bedrooms, the Number of Bathrooms, etc.—and two binary variables
that describe the contractual structure of each listing: 1) Exclusive, which is an indicator
variable equal to one if the broker is the exclusive agent of the landlord, and zero if the listing
is open; and 2) Fee, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the broker collects his
own fee from prospective tenants, and zero if the landlord commits to pay the broker’s fee
(i.e., a no-fee apartment). The original data contain some old apartment listings; however,
we restrict our analysis to data from the most recent 12-month period covered in the data
(May 2009-April 2010) since there are many more missing values in the oldest listings. We
also drop observations for which the monthly rent is below $500 or above $30,000, as we
suspect that most of these rents are likely misreported.13
We complement this main dataset on apartment listings with additional data on Man-
hattan housing markets. First, from the website of the New York City Department of City
Planning, we obtain PLUTO, an extensive land use and geographic database at the tax
lot level derived from data maintained by several city agencies.14 PLUTO reports several
variables on building characteristics, such as the number of floors, the number of units in
13These thresholds represent approximately the first and the 99th percentile of the distribution of rents.
Our results do not change when we include these observations.
14http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/applbyte.shtml
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the building (Building Units), and the year built, from which we construct two indicator
variables: Prewar, equal to one if the building was built before 1940 and zero otherwise;
and New Construction, which takes the value one if the building was built in 2008 or
later. The dataset further reports the major use of structures on the tax lot, from which
we construct dummy variables for whether or not the building is a Co-op and for whether
or not the building is a Condo; the remaining buildings, which constitute the majority of
our sample, are classified mainly as elevator or walk-up apartments. PLUTO also includes
the building address, which allows us to match the apartment and building characteristics
of each listed apartment. This match is reasonably accurate, although not perfect, as we
match 72 percent of the May 2009-April 2010 apartment listings. A simple comparison
of the characteristics of the listings that we are able to match to their building charac-
teristics and of those that we are unable to match indicates that the matched data are a
random sample of the initial ones: The summary statistics are almost identical between
the matched and unmatched samples.
Second, from the website of the New York City Rent Guidelines Board, we obtain a
list of rent-stabilized buildings.15 With these data, we create an indicator variable Rent
Stabilized, equal to one for any apartment in our listing data, the exact address of which
appears in this list of rent-stabilized buildings, and zero otherwise.
Finally, we obtain monthly aggregate reports for the period January 2008-April 2012
on Manhattan rental markets from the website of Citi Habitats.16 These data report
the Vacancy Rate for each month-neighborhood pair, and the Average Rent for
each month-neighborhood-apartment size (i.e., studios, one-bedroom, two-bedroom, three-
bedroom apartments) triple.
We use these data to construct further characteristics that our description of landlord
decision-making in Section 4 suggests should be relevant in explaining the variation in
contractual arrangements. Specifically, we construct a measure of atypicality for each unit
and a measure of local market conditions more stratified than Vacancy Rate.
15http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/resources/sta bldngs/2010ManhattanBldgs.pdf
16http://www.citi-habitats.com/market.php
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Fig. 1: Histogram of the measure of atypicality of the apartment in the data.
A measure of atypicality. We follow Haurin (1988) and define an index of Atypical-
ity as:
Atypicalityi = β
∣
∣hi − h¯
∣
∣ , (1)
where hi is the vector of observable characteristics of apartment i; h¯ is the vector of average
observable characteristics in the sample; and β is the vector of implicit hedonic prices of
observable characteristics derived from the hedonic regression
pi = βhi + i,
in which the dependent variable pi is the monthly asking rent of the listing.
Figure 1 displays the histogram of the index, showing that it exhibits substantial vari-
ation and a long right tail: The average equals 2.44, the standard deviation 1.87 and the
skewness 3.70. Most apartments are quite typical—one-bedroom, one-bathroom, unfur-
nished apartments in apartment buildings on the Upper East Side—whereas other apart-
ment types are less common—large apartments in co-ops in the Financial District or in
Harlem, in particular. More specifically, the most important components of the Atyp-
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icality index are related to the size of the apartment: the number of rooms and the
number of bathrooms.
Submarket vacancy rate. The Vacancy Rate variable, while providing a useful mea-
sure, is perhaps coarse since apartments of different types may belong to different submar-
kets, each with its own supply and demand. Therefore, we seek a more stratified measure
that captures variation in submarkets. Specifically, for each neighborhood i, we estimate
by OLS the parameters {βi, βi0, βi1, βi2, βi3} of the equation:
Vacancy Rateit = βi + βi0Av. Rent Studioit + βi1Av. Rent 1brit +
βi2Av. Rent 2brit + βi3Av. Rent 3brit + it. (2)
We then construct the Vacancy Rate Studioit as βi0Av. Rent Studioit, and sim-
ilarly for the other apartment types. We then match these additional variables to each
listing and define the Vacancy Rate Submarket as the vacancy rate of its correspond-
ing neighborhood-month-apartment type triple—i.e., the Vacancy Rate Submarket
equals the Vacancy Rate 1br for a one-bedroom apartment, and similarly for other
apartment types. While we acknowledge that our measure Vacancy Rate Submarket
may suffer from some potential biases (i.e., measurement error), the absence of easily-
available alternatives makes it appealing to capture the stratification into different housing
submarkets, as identified by Citi Habitats. Further advantages of our measure are: 1) it ex-
ploits the differential mix of apartment types across neighborhoods by estimating equation
(2) separately for each neighborhood; and 2) it exploits a longer time-series (i.e., January
2008-April 2012) than the time span of our listing dataset.17
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
The final dataset contains more than 15,000 listings, distributed over all Manhattan areas.
The average listing is for a one-bedroom apartment—one bedroom, two additional rooms
(typically, a living room and a kitchen) and one bathroom—in a prewar, 15-floor eleva-
tor building with 120 apartments. However, the dataset contains listings of apartments
17We have also performed our empirical analysis using the neighborhood-month aggregate Vacancy
Rate, as reported by Citi Habitats, and found results similar to those reported in later sections.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Monthly Rent 3441.764 3184.35
Number of Rooms 3.341 1.293
Number of Bedrooms 1.156 0.730
Number of Bathrooms 1.267 0.589
Furnished 0.134 0.341
Atypicality 2.443 1.872
Fee 0.790 0.407
Exclusive 0.716 0.450
Building Units 121.256 148.321
Prewar Building 0.595 0.490
Co-op 0.097 0.295
Condo 0.287 0.452
New Construction 0.004 0.064
Building Number of Floors 14.017 12.535
Rent-Stabilized 0.385 0.486
Vacancy Rate Submarket −6.378 10.919
Notes—This table provides summary statistics of the main variables in the dataset, which consists
of 15,524 observations.
of many different sizes, as well as in buildings of many different sizes. The average rent
is approximately $3,450 per month, with a large variation, as well. Interestingly, there is
substantial variation in landlords’ agreements with brokers: 63 percent of all listings are
Exclusive and Fee; 16 percent are Non-Exclusive and Fee; 12 percent are Non-
Exclusive and No-Fee; and nine percent are Exclusive and No-Fee. Moreover, our
measure of (sub)market conditions Vacancy Rate Submarket also exhibits large vari-
ation: At the aggregate neighborhood level, vacancy rates can more than double in the
12-month period, and rents can change by as much as 15 percent in some submarkets, with
larger apartments exhibiting larger variations than smaller ones.
The data provide a comprehensive description of the Manhattan residential rental mar-
ket and are well-suited to investigating how contractual agreements between landlords and
brokers vary with apartment and building characteristics, as well as with market condi-
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tions. Even with all these advantages, however, the datasets pose some challenges. First,
the data we have are not exhaustive for all Manhattan rentals and are likely to exclude
some listings—for example, they are likely to exclude sublets that typically do not employ
brokers but work through informal online listings. Similarly, some landlords who wish to
avoid the possibility of co-brokering or prefer working only with familiar agents will nec-
essarily seek to avoid appearing on an online platform such as the one we use. Our data
consist of apartments listed by management companies and by landlords’ brokers, and,
thus, they represent a selected sample of Manhattan real estate. However, conversations
with Manhattan real-estate brokers indicate that our data are representative of the Man-
hattan rental market. In the Appendix, we assess the representativeness of our data by
comparing them with housing information from the U.S. Census. The comparison indicates
that our database is broadly representative of the Manhattan rental market, although the
apartments in our sample are, on average, smaller and more expensive than the average
Manhattan apartment reported in the Census. Second, the listings do not report any land-
lord characteristics. In particular, they do not allow us to identify a landlord who chooses
to list units in one building as open listings and through an exclusive agent in another. Fi-
nally, in our view, the main limitation is that the data do not report transaction outcomes.
Specifically, we do not know tenant characteristics, how long each apartment remained on
the market and the price at which it was eventually rented. Hence, one important limi-
tation of our analysis is that we cannot evaluate the ex-post performance of the different
contractual features that we focus on.
6 The Role of Exclusive Agreements
In this section, we report descriptive patterns of the use of exclusive agreements. These
patterns suggest that exclusive agreements are more likely to be used for more-atypical
apartments, according to both observable and unobservable characteristics. This is consis-
tent with the idea that unusual units require specific effort and that an exclusive agreement
can induce an agent to provide such effort. Further, we find some suggestive evidence that
landlords more interested in screening potential tenants are more likely to use exclusive
agreements.
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Fig. 2: The figure displays the fraction of apartments with exclusive agreements (left scale) and
the number of listings (right scale), by number of bedrooms.
Table 1 shows that a minority of the listings—13 percent—refer to furnished apart-
ments. Interestingly, 94 percent of these listings are Exclusive. This might be seen as
consistent with both of these explanations of exclusive agreements since a landlord may
have greater concerns regarding the tenant’s behavior and since a furnished unit is likely to
be relatively idiosyncratic. Similarly, listings that allow pets are significantly more likely
to be Exclusive than those that do not (76 percent versus 53 percent), suggesting, again,
that landlords may be more likely to choose an exclusive agreement when concerned about
tenants’ behavior. Finally, Co-op boards are notoriously selective and require complicated
application processes; similarly, units in Condos are more likely to be let by individ-
ual landlords rather than by large residential property owners, thus potentially involving
more-idiosyncratic landlord preferences and processes. The raw correlations are consistent
with these intuitions: 92 percent of Co-ops and 89 percent of Condos are Exclusive,
compared to 60 percent of other apartments.
One way to investigate the role of the atypicality of an apartment is to compare apart-
ments based on their size. The average apartment in Manhattan is notoriously small. In
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Fig. 3: The figure displays the fraction of one-bedroom apartments with exclusive agreements
by quintiles of rent.
Figure 2, we plot the number of listings by number of bedrooms (dotted line): Small apart-
ments are the norm, whereas larger apartments are more atypical. Interestingly, in Figure
2, we also plot the fraction of Exclusive listings by the number of bedrooms (solid line).
Larger, more “niche”apartments are more likely to have exclusive agreements in which the
broker collects the fee from the prospective tenant.
A further way to analyze whether the atypicality of an apartment matters for brokers’
contractual arrangements is by classifying apartments by their listed monthly rent. Since
the correlation between number of bedrooms and apartment rent is equal to 0.536, exclusive
agreements are also employed more frequently for more-expensive apartments: The average
monthly rent of an exclusive rental is $3,789, whereas the average monthly rent of a non-
exclusive rental is $2,564. To control for the effect of size, in Figure 3 we plot the fraction
of one-bedroom Exclusive listings by quintile of monthly rent. The patterns are clearly
non-monotonic: One-bedroom apartments in the tails of the distribution—i.e., either the
cheapest or the most expensive ones—are more likely than apartments in the middle of the
distribution to have exclusive listings. If extreme prices (either very low or very high) arise
because of unusual features of the rental units, landlords are more likely to use exclusive
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agreements for them.
Regression Analysis. We use the following specification to investigate what is driving
the use of exclusive agreements and, in particular, the extent to which these are more likely
to be employed for more-atypical apartments:
Exclusivei = f (β0 + βAAtypicalityi +Vacancy Rate Submarketi + βXXi) .
(3)
The dependent variable Exclusivei is equal to 1 if listing i is exclusive, and 0 otherwise.
The main variables of interest are Atypicality, our measure of apartment idiosyncrasy
defined in equation (1) and Vacancy Rate Submarket, as described in Section 5. Xi is
a set of variables specific to each apartment i, such as Number of Bedrooms, Number
of Bathrooms and other characteristics of the unit and its building. We also include
in our specifications zipcode fixed-effects and month-of-listing fixed-effects to capture any
unobserved zipcode- and month-specific factor, thus allowing a cleaner identification of
apartments’ Atypicality. Letting f be the c.d.f. of the normal distribution, equation (3)
is a simple probit regression that we estimate by maximum likelihood.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the marginal effects obtained from the estimated co-
efficients of the probit model. Specification (1) includes 11 month-of-listing and 41 zip-
code fixed-effects, and specification (2) further adds five school-district fixed-effects. The
marginal effects of theAtypicality are significantly larger than zero in both specifications,
indicating that more-atypical apartments are more likely to have exclusive agreements.
Moreover, the estimates reported in Table 2 imply that the proxy for the atypicality of the
apartment is also economically significant. According to specification (2), a one-standard-
deviation increase in the value of Atypicality increases the probability that a listing is
exclusive by 4.6 percentage points, which is, approximately, a 6.4-percent increase in the
probability that the listing is exclusive.
The marginal effects of other explanatory variables confirm the previous descriptive
evidence. Specifically, condos and co-ops, as well as larger apartments, are more likely
to be listed as exclusive. Similarly, furnished rentals are almost always exclusive. The
positive coefficient on Prewar Building and the negative coefficient on Building Units
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Table 2: Exclusive Agreements
Exclusive (1) (2)
Atypical 0.0199*** 0.0185***
(0.0075) (0.0072)
Vacancy Rate Submarket -0.0047* -0.0051**
(0.0024) (0.0024)
Rent Stabilized -0.0612*** -0.0592***
(0.0150) (0.0150)
Log(Monthly Rent) -0.0007 0.0033
(0.0325) (0.0327)
Co-op 0.1775*** 0.1774***
(0.0075) (0.0075)
Condo 0.2715*** 0.2698***
(0.0152) (0.0152)
Number of Rooms 0.1560*** 0.1558***
(0.0153) (0.0153)
Number of Bedrooms -0.1188*** -0.1195***
(0.0122) (0.0123)
Number of Bathrooms -0.0465** -0.0449**
(0.0205) (0.0202)
Floor Number 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Penthouse -0.0925* -0.0906*
(0.0507) (0.0502)
Furnished 0.1289*** 0.1289***
(0.0216) (0.0215)
Pet Allowed 0.0780*** 0.0785***
(0.0211) (0.0211)
Elevator -0.0328** -0.0331**
(0.0159) (0.0159)
Elevator and Doorman 0.1747*** 0.1736***
(0.0224) (0.0223)
Building Units -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Prewar Building 0.1880*** 0.1895***
(0.0224) (0.0224)
New Construction 0.1476*** 0.1414***
(0.0364) (0.0426)
Building Number of Floor -0.0014 -0.0013
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Zipcode fixed effects 41 41
Monthly fixed effects 11 11
School District fixed effects 0 5
Observations 15, 524 15, 524
Notes: Specifications (1)-(2) present the marginal effects calculated from probit regressions. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the listing is exclusive, and zero otherwise. The estimated regressions further include binary indicator variables for
whether the building is a landmark and for whether the building is in an historic district. The standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the neighborhood level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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perhaps supply further evidence consistent with landlords using exclusive agreements for
more-atypical units. Prewar buildings tend to be more idiosyncratic and feature more
heterogeneous units, whereas units in buildings with very many units (the largest building
in our data contains 1,118 units) are likely to be “cookie-cutters” that require relatively
little specific effort on the part of agents, and such buildings are likely to have dedicated
marketing resources. It is noteworthy that Rent-Stabilized apartments are less likely
to be listed as exclusive. This may be consistent with the view that Rent-Stabilized
apartments are appealing to renters, and so marketing them may require less effort from
agents. Conversely, units in newly-constructed buildings may require agent effort that is
specific to these new units.
In addition, there is suggestive evidence that landlords are more likely to use exclusive
agents for more-atypical units when concerns about screening tenants are more pronounced.
In particular, they do so for co-op and condo units, for units that allow pets, for higher-end
tall buildings with doormen, and for large units on high floors. In addition, the negative
marginal effects of the Vacancy Rate Submarket suggests that landlords are less likely
to use exclusive agents to screen tenants in “cold” markets.
7 The Role of Fee Listings
In this section, we report descriptive patterns on the use of Fee listings. Specifically,
we document that the broker is more likely to collect the fee from the tenant than from
the landlord when the apartment is not rent-stabilized and when the Vacancy Rate
Submarket is lower. Moreover, the broker is more likely to collect the fee from the tenant
than from the landlord in Co-op and Condo buildings. Overall, these patterns suggest
that an important role of Fee listings is to attract longer-term tenants.
The simplest tests are suggestive: Among listings of rent-stabilized apartments, 74
percent are Fee, whereas 82 percent of non rent-stabilized apartments are Fee (the p-
value of the t-test of the null hypothesis that the difference is equal to zero is 0). Similarly,
our measure Vacancy Rate Submarket is negatively correlated with the submarket’s
fraction of Fee listings, although this correlation is quite low: −.03.Moreover, 88 percent of
Co-ops and 84 percent of Condos are Fee, compared to 75 percent of other apartments.
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Regression Analysis. We further estimate regression equations similar to those reported
in Table 2. However, the dependent variable is now Fee: an indicator equal to 1 if the
listing specifies that the broker collects his fee from the prospective tenant, and 0 if the
landlord pays brokers’ fees. The main variables of interest are now the Vacancy Rate
Submarket and whether the apartment is Rent-Stabilized. As before, we control
for a set of variables specific to each apartment i and to its building. We also include
in our specifications zipcode fixed-effects and month-of-listing fixed-effects to capture any
unobserved zipcode- and month-specific factor, thus allowing a cleaner identification of the
effects of a Rent-Stabilized apartment and the Vacancy Rate Submarket.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the marginal effects of probit models. Specification
(1) includes 11 month-of-listing and 41 zipcode fixed-effects, and specification (2) adds
five school-district fixed-effects. The coefficients of the variable Rent-Stabilized are
negative in both specifications. This is consistent with the view that landlords of rent-
stabilized units, anticipating the constraints on the increase in nominal rents for lease
renewals, should prefer to pay brokers’ fees so that they can set higher initial rents. The
magnitude of this effect is quite large. According to the coefficients of specification (2), a
Rent-Stabilized apartment has a 5.3-percent lower probability of having a Fee listing
than an unregulated apartment, which represents a 6.7-percent decrease in the likelihood
that the listing is Fee.
The coefficients of neighborhoods’ Vacancy Rate Submarket are negative in all
specifications, indicating that landlords (rather than tenants) are more likely to pay brokers’
fees when market is less tight. Furthermore, the estimates of specifications (2) mean that
a one-standard-deviation increase in the value of Vacancy Rate Submarket decreases
the probability that a listing is Fee by approximately 5.8 percentage point, which is,
approximately, a 7.3-percent decrease in the probability that the listing is Fee. Since
the time-series variation in the Vacancy Rate Submarket over the business cycle is
likely to be larger than our 12-month sample variability, this may understate the economic
significance of this relationship.
Some statistically significant results have no easy interpretation (in particular, the result
on “penthouse” units, though this may reflect that it is a fairly common designation),
whereas other significant variables in the regression may reflect concerns over selection:
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Table 3: Who Pays the Fee?
Fee (1) (2)
Atypical 0.0107* 0.0115*
(0.0060) (0.0062)
Vacancy Rate Submarket -0.0053** -0.0053**
(0.0027) (0.0026)
Rent Stabilized -0.0534*** -0.0533***
(0.0123) (0.0123)
Log(Monthly Rent) -0.0287 -0.0297
(0.0191) (0.0189)
Co-op 0.0734*** 0.0734***
(0.0132) (0.0132)
Condo 0.1155*** 0.1164***
(0.0191) (0.0191)
Number of Rooms 0.0117 0.0114
(0.0077) (0.0076)
Number of Bedrooms -0.0113 -0.0106
(0.0089) (0.0089)
Number of Bathrooms 0.0212 0.0193
(0.0190) (0.0188)
Floor Number -0.0012* -0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Penthouse -0.0894** -0.0903**
(0.0369) (0.0367)
Furnished 0.1247*** 0.1247***
(0.0108) (0.0107)
Pet Allowed -0.0119 -0.0130
(0.0154) (0.0152)
Elevator 0.1080*** 0.1049***
(0.0240) (0.0239)
Elevator and Doorman -0.0687*** -0.0691***
(0.0152) (0.0151)
Building Units -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Prewar Building 0.0975*** 0.0959***
(0.0168) (0.0167)
New Construction -0.1356 -0.1397
(0.0920) (0.0922)
Building Number of Floor 0.0018* 0.0018*
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Zipcode fixed effects 41 41
Monthly fixed effects 11 11
School District fixed effects 0 5
Observations 15, 524 15, 524
Notes: Specifications (1)-(2) present the marginal effects calculated from probit regressions. The dependent variable is equal
to one if the broker collects fees from the tenants, and zero if the owner pays brokers’ fees. The estimated regressions further
include binary indicator variables for whether the building is a landmark and for whether the building is in an historic district.
The standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the neighborhood level. .*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent level, respectively.
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For example, turnover is a significant concern for units in co-ops and condos, as well as for
furnished apartments, which tend to be Fee apartments (i.e., the tenant pays the broker’s
fee), and may be of greater concern in more-idiosyncratic pre-war buildings and buildings
with few units.
8 Joint Choices
We use a bivariate probit model to analyze in a more-complete way the range of contractual
arrangements between landlords and brokers. Specifically, based on the analyses in the pre-
vious sections, the bivariate probit considers four possible outcomes: 1) aNon-Exclusive,
Fee listing—i.e., a listing in which the broker collects a fee from the prospective tenant; 2)
a Non-Exclusive, No-Fee listing—i.e., a listing in which the broker collects a fee from
the landlord; 3) an Exclusive, Fee listing—i.e., an exclusive listing in which the broker
collects a fee from the prospective tenant; and 4) an Exclusive, No-Fee listing—i.e., an
exclusive listing in which the broker collects a fee from the landlord.
Table 4 presents the estimated marginal effects of two different specifications. Specifi-
cation (1) includes month-of-listing and zipcode fixed-effects, and specification (2) further
adds school-district fixed-effects. The coefficients of the Atypicality index are positive in
the equations explaining Exclusive listing, in line with earlier results that landlords are
relatively more likely to rent out an atypical apartment through an exclusive agent. The
coefficients of theVacancy Rate Submarket are negative in the case of Exclusive and
Fee listings, confirming our previous finding that landlords are more likely to pay brokers’
fees in cold markets than in hot markets. Similarly, Rent-Stabilized apartments are less
likely to have Exclusive and Fee listings; this is consistent with the intuition that rent-
stabilized apartments require relatively little marketing effort from agents (accounting for
the lack of exclusivity) and that landlords might aim for slightly higher initial rents when
the rate at which they can increase an existing tenant’s rent is limited (accounting for the
no fee). Moreover, Co-op and Condo apartments, which are likely to be somewhat more
idiosyncratic in landlord preferences (and imply a greater desire for screening), are more
likely to have Exclusive and Fee listings.
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 confirm our previous results on the use of differ-
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Table 4: Joint Decisions, Bivariate Probit
(1) (2)
Outcome Exclusive Fee Exclusive Fee
Atypical 0.0182** 0.0117* 0.0167** 0.0123*
(0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0068) (0.0064)
Vacancy Rate Submarket -0.0038 -0.0050* -0.0042* -0.0049*
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Rent Stabilized -0.0598*** -0.0502*** -0.0579*** -0.0501***
(0.0146) (0.0123) (0.0146) (0.0123)
Log(Monthly Rent) 0.0098 -0.0295 0.0138 -0.0302
(0.0326) (0.0196) (0.0327) (0.0195)
Co-op 0.1760*** 0.0745*** 0.1758*** 0.0746***
(0.0075) (0.0133) (0.0075) (0.0133)
Condo 0.2699*** 0.1198*** 0.2682*** 0.1205***
(0.0148) (0.0187) (0.0148) (0.0187)
Number of Rooms 0.1580*** 0.0112 0.1578*** 0.0110
(0.0152) (0.0079) (0.0151) (0.0079)
Number of Bedrooms -0.1239*** -0.0100 -0.1246*** -0.0094
(0.0120) (0.0092) (0.0121) (0.0092)
Number of Bathrooms -0.0490** 0.0180 -0.0472** 0.0165
(0.0198) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0191)
Floor Number 0.0010 -0.0012* 0.0010 -0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Penthouse -0.0885* -0.0904** -0.0862* -0.0908**
(0.0502) (0.0382) (0.0497) (0.0380)
Furnished 0.1212*** 0.1235*** 0.1212*** 0.1237***
(0.0222) (0.0111) (0.0221) (0.0111)
Pet Allowed 0.0770*** -0.0063 0.0773*** -0.0075
(0.0204) (0.0153) (0.0205) (0.0151)
Elevator -0.0295* 0.0993*** -0.0300* 0.0967***
(0.0158) (0.0235) (0.0158) (0.0234)
Elevator and Doorman 0.1686*** -0.0662*** 0.1676*** -0.0669***
(0.0220) (0.0151) (0.0218) (0.0150)
Building Units -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Prewar Building 0.1871*** 0.0930*** 0.1884*** 0.0918***
(0.0223) (0.0161) (0.0223) (0.0160)
New Construction 0.1526*** -0.1438 0.1469*** -0.1470
(0.0280) (0.0931) (0.0343) (0.0931)
Building Number of Floor -0.0012 0.0018* -0.0012 0.0018*
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009)
ρ 0.406 0.405
(0.037) (0.036)
Zipcode fixed effects 41 41
Monthly fixed effects 11 11
School District fixed effects 0 5
Observations 15,524 15,524
Notes: Specifications (1)-(2) present the marginal effects calculated from bivariate probit models. The dependent variables
are equal to one if the listing is exclusive, and zero otherwise; and equal to one if the broker collects fees from the tenants,
and zero if the owner pays brokers’ fees. The estimated equations further include binary indicator variables for whether the
building is in a landmark and for whether the building is in an historic district. The standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the neighborhood level. *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
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ent listing contracts, and the magnitudes of the estimated effects reported are comparable
to those reported in Tables 2 and 3. At the same time, they present a perhaps richer and
more nuanced picture of the role of the different contractual features that we examine—
i.e., the exclusivity of the agreement and who pays the broker fee. More specifically, the
signs of the estimated marginal effects of several (but not all) observable characteristics
are the same in the equations that determine whether or not the listing is Exclusive and
whether or not it is a Fee listing, suggesting that the two contractual features are comple-
ments. However, the estimated relative magnitudes of the observable characteristics differ
quite substantially in the two equations, suggesting that different contractual features are
different margins that adjust in response to different apartment and market characteris-
tics. The correlation coefficient between the unobservable characteristics, estimated to be
approximately equal to 0.4, further confirms these views.
9 Concluding Remarks
We present new evidence on the design of contracts for intermediaries in frictional matching
markets. Using data from the Manhattan residential rental market, our results highlight
a role both for providing incentives for specific efforts (consistent with a large theoretical
literature) and for screening candidates (either directly, in a way that can be interpreted
as another form of specific effort, or through the induced schedule of repayments through
time). Specifically, in the Manhattan residential market, landlords are more likely to use
exclusive contracts with real-estate agents when the apartment is more atypical—suggesting
that agents’ provision of specific effort is relevant for this decision—and when the type of
tenant is of greater concern, suggesting a screening role. The latter consideration appears
to play a role in a landlord’s decision to pay the broker’s fee since this can influence the
rent in the case of renewal and, thus, the selection of tenants that a listing attracts.
Our analysis has some important limitations. First, it is a study of just one market in
one locality—i.e., Manhattan—and its institutions. Moreover, while our empirical findings
are consistent with our theoretical explanations, a lack of further data prevents us from
examining these mechanisms in more detail. Specifically, our data provide few outcome
measures, such as whether the unit transacts at the listed price (though we believe that
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most units do); the length of time that the unit is on the market before it is rented;18 and
the satisfaction of the renter/landlord with the match (for example, characteristics of the
renter; whether the renter pays rent in a timely fashion; whether the lease is renewed).
Thus, our data do allow us to document some interesting correlates with contractual form
but are not amenable to exploring their consequences.
One of the unusual features of the data is the variation in who pays the broker’s fee.
Our data suggest that this contractual arrangement may play a role in screening tenants,
but this poses a theoretical challenge in that as one could imagine screening through more-
sophisticated contracts (for example, longer-term contracts with provisions for renewal
rather than standardized 12-month contracts). In part, this may reflect legal restrictions
in a market that is subject to substantial regulation, or it may reflect other features of the
market and its participants that lie beyond the scope of this paper.
18This is a concern not only about selection into our dataset—which may not be at the “start”of the
time in which the landlord seeks a renter—but also about the nature of our data, which provides poor
measures of time listed in the MLS, our data provider.
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Table 5: Comparison among datasets
Variable MLX 2000 Census
2000 Census,
Moved in Last Year
Number of Rooms
3.341
(1.293)
3.355
(1.457)
2.589
(1.359)
Number of Bedrooms
1.156
(0.730)
2.575
(1.027)
2.055
(0.978)
Notes: This table compares the MLX dataset with the 2000 Census. The last column reports statistics
conditioning on households that reported having moved into their residence “This year or last year.”
A Representativeness of the MLX Data
We compare our listings data with the publicly-available five-percent sample of the 2000
Census. The Census asks some dwelling questions, including ownership status (rent versus
own), along with detailed geographic information, such as the county. Hence, we can
construct a sample of all households in rented apartments in Manhattan. Glaeser and
Luttmer (2003), among others, have constructed similar samples.
Table 5 reports this comparison. TheNumber of Rooms in the MLX dataset is almost
identical to that in the 2000 Census, whereas the Number of Bedrooms is smaller in the
MLX than in the Census. The last column of Table 5 reports Census statistics conditioning
on households that reported having moved into their residence “This year or last year.”
Those households report living in apartments that have fewer rooms (2.589 versus 3.312),
but more bedrooms (2.055 versus 1.127). The latter difference might reflect the fact that in
Manhattan, sharing an apartment (with friends, colleagues, or others) is common. In these
cases, tenants often convert rooms for use as bedrooms, whereas brokers cannot legally
advertise these rooms as bedrooms.
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